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FAITH, FAITHFULNESS, AND VIRTUE
Robert Audi
The concept of faith is central in the philosophy of religion, and the concept 
of virtue is central in ethics. Both can be clarified by exploring their rela-
tionships with each other and their connection with conduct, reasons for 
action, and the good. One important question is whether faith is a virtue. 
Answering this requires at least a partial account of what constitutes faith 
and of what makes a characteristic a virtue. The answer also depends on 
whether we are speaking of religious faith or of faith in general, and on what 
“content” the faith in question has. This paper approaches the question by 
contrasting faith with faithfulness, connecting both with trust, and explor-
ing conditions under which each may count as a virtue.
For many people it is natural to think of faith as a good thing in human 
life. Even those who are not religious may think of religious faith as good; 
but both in and outside religion there is such a thing as blind faith, and 
religious faith may be marred by fanaticism. What of secular faith? Many 
people have faith in their families; some have faith in love as a positive 
force; and some have faith in institutions or communities: in democracy 
as a political structure, in the United Nations as an organization, in their 
country as a cultural leader. I am speaking of attitudinal faith, the kind 
commonly referred to by the phrase “faith in.” Such faith may be a power-
ful element in a person’s motivation, emotionality, and conduct, but it is 
not a trait of character. Faithfulness, by contrast, may be sufficiently rooted 
in a person to constitute a trait of character, though we may also use the 
term for certain instances of keeping faith, as where a person is steadfastly 
faithful to colleagues and students and deservedly commended for faith-
fulness to them. My main concern will be with the question whether faith-
fulness as a trait of character is a virtue and with the related questions of 
how that trait is related to attitudinal faith and how religious faith, even if 
not specifically a virtue of character, may be virtuous.
1. Faithfulness as a Virtue of Character
It may be uncontroversial that (as I assume here) a person’s virtues, in 
what seems the primary sense of the term, constitute a species of traits 
of character. It may also be uncontroversial that virtues constitute praise-
worthy elements in a person’s psychology. More specifically, I suggest 
that to have a virtue of character is to have a praiseworthy character trait 
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that tends to ground conduct and to motivate its possessor to pursue the 
particular good or kind of good with respect to which the trait counts as 
a virtue.1 Let us first take justice and beneficence as examples and then 
compare the trait of faithfulness to these.
Justice as a virtue of character might be viewed as deontic, in that the 
conduct-guiding good in question (a deontic good) concerns what is oblig-
atory or permissible in the moral sense, as in the case of a fair distribu-
tion of benefits to employees. A just person will be strongly guided by 
standards of fairness, especially in distributive and retributive matters. 
By contrast, beneficence as a trait might be considered axiological, since 
the good that a beneficent person properly aims at is characteristically the 
enhancement of the well-being of other people. That aim can be under-
stood largely in terms of such non-moral notions as relieving pain and 
enhancing pleasure.
Faithfulness as a trait of character is not intrinsically either deontic or 
axiological; it normally centers on allegiances to (above all) persons one 
cares about in a certain way. There is, however, great variety in the catego-
ries of persons or things that a faithful person must care about. Must even 
the category of persons figure essentially in understanding faithfulness? 
Imagine someone who is generally ethical but leads a mainly solitary life 
and does not enter into relations with others that call for being faithful 
to them. If we add that the person is faithful to animals (say, livestock), 
it is plausible to consider the person to be of a faithful kind. But such a 
person would not qualify as having the trait of faithfulness—as opposed 
to a faithful relation to the animals in question—apart from a suitably 
grounded, adequately strong disposition to be faithful to other people if 
they should come to have certain kinds of relations with the person. Pos-
session of the trait, then, does not entail actually exhibiting faithfulness 
to persons, but the concept of such relations is essential for understanding 
the nature of the trait. In at least that implicit way, faithfulness as a trait of 
persons is apparently social. Moreover, that it at least concerns relations to 
living beings is plain, whatever the domain of the “social.”
If faithfulness as a trait of character is essentially connected with alle-
giance to persons and is not necessarily deontic or axiological, it is such that 
if it essentially includes (for instance) a sound moral code, it will thereby 
encompass both deontic and axiological elements. This conditional point 
1This characterization is quite generic and seems compatible with a number of concep-
tions of virtues of character. See, e.g., the detailed account given by Alasdair MacIntyre in 
After Virtue, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), chap. 14 and pp. 
218–220; and Christine Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003). She offers, as a widely shared conception of a virtue, “a good quality of charac-
ter, more specifically a disposition to respond to, or acknowledge, items within its field or 
fields in an excellent or good enough way” (19). This paper addresses virtues of character 
in contrast to those of mind—intellectual virtues such as clarity of mind, insightfulness, 
and intellectual curiosity. Some intellectual virtues may meet the criteria I offer for virtues 
of character, but the differences between the two notions should not be important for this 
paper and cannot be pursued here.
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holds for both kinds of faithfulness considered so far: faithfulness as a trait 
of character—global faithfulness—and allegiant faith (or faithfulness to), which 
is focal and constituted by being faithful to some person or non-personal 
entity such as an institution. Focal faithfulness (allegiance) may be to a per-
son irrespective of whether the person is moral; to a way of life, such as an 
aesthetically grounded one that is not mainly moral if moral at all; or to an 
institution, such as an army, which might be amoral. Focal allegiances are 
central in typical instances of the trait of faithfulness, but even a diverse 
set of such focal allegiances does not entail having the character trait of 
faithfulness.2 Someone could be faithful to just close friends and still lack 
the elements of loyalty necessary for being, overall, a faithful person.
It should also be stressed that even if a person’s attitudinal faith (faith 
in) is highly comprehensive, as is faith in democratic institutions, the 
person might not have the character trait of faithfulness. This may not 
be widely realized because we so often speak of faith in the context of 
considering faith in God, and that kind of attitudinal faith is commonly 
presupposed to imply some degree of commitment to being faithful to 
what God, at least in the eyes of the person in question, commands or 
requires. Nonetheless, someone could have faith in God or great faith in 
other people, yet not be able to keep faith with them and thus lack faithful-
ness toward them. Having faith in others is mainly a matter of how we 
view them, and how we are disposed to respond to them, in terms of what 
we value. Being faithful to others is more a matter of how we act toward 
them in terms of what they value (though it is not wholly a matter of what 
they value, since people can be clearly mistaken about their own good).
One way to see this difference is by considering the relation of each 
kind of faith to trust. If I have faith in you, then I trust you, at least within 
a certain domain of conduct. If I am faithful to you, you may properly 
trust me; and if I am faithful to an ideal, I may, in the main, be trusted 
to live up to it. Neither case of trust implies the other. We can have faith 
in people, such as foreign heads of state, with whom we have either no 
relationship or one that does not call on us to keep faith. One way to put 
the contrast is this: faith is fulfilled when its object meets certain expecta-
tions—roughly, fulfills the trust—of the subject; faithfulness is fulfilled 
when the subject—the faithful person—meets certain expectations, or cer-
tain hypothetical expectations, of the object.3
None of this is to deny that attitudinal faith in a person often should 
and often does go with a certain kind of allegiant faith toward that person. 
2The claim is not that no combination of such allegiances entails having the trait of faith-
fulness, or indeed being a person of faith, but that a mere multiplicity of allegiances alone, 
apart from their content and other conditions, does not. More will be said below about the 
notions of a faithfulness simpliciter and that of being a person of faith.
3Hypothetical expectations must be mentioned here because one could be faithful to 
someone who either has no expectations toward one, as with celebrities who do not even 
know all their loyal fans, or has the wrong kind of expectations toward the faithful person, 
such as suspicions dominated by unfounded rumors.
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But faith in a person that is not accompanied by faithfulness to either that 
person or any other, or even to certain standards, is conceivable. Nonethe-
less, faith in a person usually implies the appropriateness, and sometimes 
a prima facie obligation to maintain, allegiant faith as faithfulness to the 
standards or values—such as justice and honesty—with respect to which 
one has faith in the other. If I have faith in God’s forgiveness, it is at best 
inappropriate for me not to keep faith with some standard or practice of 
forgiveness myself. Neither faith in a person nor faith in a moral code, 
however, precludes weakness of will that leads to violation of the stan-
dards or values in question. One could also be quite cynical about people, 
having little faith in them, while keeping faith with them and living up to 
high moral standards oneself.
2. Two Kinds of Virtue of Character
There is much to learn from comparing faithfulness with the virtue of 
courage. I will consider both in the light of a distinction between two 
kinds of virtues of character that are important in ethics but rarely dis-
tinguished. I begin with the moral domain, since it is important to say 
enough about moral virtue to see whether we should regard faithfulness 
as an instance of it.
Substantive moral virtues, such as honesty, fairness, and beneficence, are 
traits that are morally good in themselves. One way to see this is to re-
flect on how having them implies a significant measure of success both 
in internalizing and in living up to sound moral standards. To have these 
traits requires (among other things) certain attitudes toward others, such 
as a kind of respect, certain kinds of intentions in interpersonal relations, 
a sensitivity to the difference between right and wrong, and a tendency to 
act toward others for an appropriate range of reasons, for instance out of a 
sense of obligation as opposed to self-interest. But there are other virtues, 
such as courage and one kind of conscientiousness—roughly, a thorough-
ness and steadfastness in doing what one is committed to—for which 
these points do not hold. Courage and the conscientiousness in question 
are not morally good in themselves, nor does their mere possession entail 
any commitment to moral standards. To be sure, the courageous must 
have the capacity to take pain in the service of what they value; but they 
need not have moral values. Courage and the kind of conscientiousness in 
question can exist in wholly unethical people, in cruel fanatics, and even 
in someone unmitigatedly diabolical. These would be people of whom it 
would be wrong to say that they have any morally good qualities, includ-
ing traits of character. This does not hold for moral virtues.
Such non-moral traits as courage and conscientiousness can also con-
tribute to the agent’s success in immoral projects in a way moral virtues 
typically do not. It is true that in special circumstances a person who is 
(say) honest but otherwise immoral might succeed better because of the 
virtue, say because of the confidence honesty can inspire. But this would 
require a great deal of luck. Asked the right questions about their conduct, 
298 Faith and Philosophy
honest but otherwise immoral people could not lie about themselves to 
avoid being crippled in their immoral projects. Honest people can refuse 
to answer questions about their intentions, but the silence of a person who 
is honest but otherwise immoral might well reveal some nasty truth or 
put the questioner on guard. Courage, by contrast, is non-accidentally con-
tributory to the success of almost any kind of substantial project, whether 
moral or not. One might think that, in a person of strong conscience, courage 
and other non-moral virtues would conduce to overall moral goodness. But 
conscience—understood generically and apart from some special theory 
of its function (as where it is, say, Kantian)—has no moral standards of its 
own. Conscience takes from elsewhere the standards it reinforces. Like a 
commanding officer, it can be misguided, bigoted, even corrupt.
In most people, however, and in all who are basically ethical, courage 
and conscientiousness tend to strengthen moral character. From the moral 
point of view, it is natural to call these traits of character adjunctive virtues.4 
Such virtues are important for achieving overall moral uprightness (as 
well as for prudence and for other non-moral traits that are not of direct 
concern here). In a good person, courage and conscientiousness are impor-
tant elements in realizing good intentions. They may also be adjunctively 
virtuous in relation to non-moral virtues as well, including each other. 
Indeed, without courage and at least enough conscientiousness to remem-
ber one’s plans and promises and to carry out cooperative projects, one 
could not be virtuous in an overall way at all and could be only as morally 
good as such weakness of character might permit. But this does not imply 
that these traits are moral virtues. A structure of bricks cannot be strong 
without cement, but cement is not a building block.
Now consider faithfulness. It is like courage in at least one way, and it 
also illustrates how courage is important to other virtues: if I lacked the 
courage to risk a financial setback, I could not be faithful to some of the 
people and ideals that faithfulness calls on me to defend. It is also true 
that faithfulness can have a positive effect on courage. Faithfulness is an 
important motivational basis for many kinds of courage or at least for 
many courageous actions. But faithfulness is like courage in not entailing 
that its possessor must adhere to any moral standard, probably not even 
one the person deems moral.
To be sure, where an instance of faithfulness qualifies as a virtue, it can-
not be utterly blind and may have to be guided by some sense of what is 
good for its object. I cannot qualify as faithful to, for instance, friends if 
what I am disposed to do for them is not guided by some sense of what is 
good for them—though at the limit, this sense might be filtered through 
what, perhaps unwisely, they ask of me. My faithfulness to a friend might 
sometimes (and within limits) require me to view what is good for the 
friend, at least in my own relation to the person, as what the friend deeply 
4Here I draw on Robert Audi and Patrick E. Murphy, “The Many Faces of Integrity,” 
Business Ethics Quarterly 16.1 (2006): 3–21.
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and reflectively wants, though I myself consider it objectively undesirable. 
One way to explain this is by appeal to the value of personal autonomy.
But even where faithfulness is guided by a conception of what is good 
for its object—say, enhancement of one’s friends’ enjoyments in life—
faithfulness alone does not entail being guided by any specifically moral 
standards. One might think that faithfulness as a virtue must be morally 
guided, but perhaps it need only be normatively guided in an appropriate 
way. Surely one could have a sufficiently rich sense of the good of a per-
son or set of persons to qualify as virtuously faithful regarding them even 
if one is guided by a notion of their good that is mainly hedonic, aesthetic, 
and otherwise non-moral. We should distinguish, then, both between, on 
the one hand, faithfulness as a trait and faithfulness as an allegiance and, 
on the other hand, between instances of the former that are virtues sim-
pliciter and instances of it that are morally constituted virtues.
Suppose that, from the moral point of view, faithfulness, like courage, 
is an adjunctive rather than a substantive virtue. This does not prevent its 
being, like courage, inherently good, hence good in itself, even if not mor-
ally good. In being inherently good, it might be considered normatively, 
though not morally, substantive. One might think that an adjunctive vir-
tue is only instrumentally good. But even where courage and faithfulness 
are contributively good, they are not simply instrumental means to the 
inherent good to which they contribute. My faithfulness to my friends 
befits our relationship and tends to contribute to its flourishing; this good 
making-element in the relationship is not merely instrumental to that 
flourishing. It is integral to, and partly constitutive of, the value of the 
relationship. Granted it may also be an instrumental means of supporting 
my friends in their aims, but this need not attenuate its contributory, often 
integral, role in the friendship.
3. The Prioritarian Character of Faithfulness to Persons
If, as we have seen, the trait of faithfulness is not intrinsically moral, this 
does not imply that faithfulness is possible without the person’s meeting 
certain normative and behavioral standards. As the association of faith-
fulness with courage suggests, a person counts as faithful only if certain 
failures to act or at least to have appropriate intentions—roughly, inten-
tions directed toward the good of the person or object—are explainable 
by appeal to appropriate kinds of interferences. Consider, by contrast, be-
ing well-intentioned, say toward one’s friends. A well-intentioned person 
may suffer fairly often from weakness of will and may sometimes simply 
forget what should be done for others. But faithfulness to persons requires 
a higher level of conformity between behavior and intention, as well as a 
higher standard of actual behavior: I am not faithful to you if, to save my-
self a loss in political capital, I sacrifice your good in an important matter.5
5Faithfulness to non-persons requires a somewhat different analysis but is also priori-
tarian in a similar way.
300 Faith and Philosophy
This last point illustrates how the notion of faithfulness to persons (like 
certain kinds of attitudinal faith) is what might be called a prioritarian no-
tion: the mere possession of attitudes and desires with the right kind of 
content and sufficient strength to produce appropriate action toward the 
person(s) in question is not enough for faithfulness; the desires must, in a 
weighted range of cases, be strong enough so that they prevail over cer-
tain kinds of competing motivation, including one’s self-interest and that 
of persons opposed to the object(s) of faithfulness. Granted, any virtue 
requires some of the agent’s motives or objectives to be predominating 
over others, but only some virtues imply the kind of significant priority 
of the interests of certain persons over those of others, especially including 
oneself. Justice and honesty, for instance, do not imply this and indeed 
tend to be egalitarian in a way faithfulness is not. Faithfulness to persons 
implies a kind of relationship, a kind that, even where the relation lacks 
mutuality, forms part of its normative basis, whereas honesty, justice, be-
neficence, and many other virtues do not imply this.6 If all virtues require 
observing certain priorities, faithfulness, in contrast to most others, is (in 
ways we have seen) both prioritarian in a way most other virtues are not 
and, in any case, partialistic.7
The prioritarian character of faithfulness does not imply that nothing 
a person of faithfulness does can be contrary to what the person takes to 
be required for the good of the object of allegiance, or that everything such 
a person does toward the other person (or non-personal object) must be 
partly motivated by an element underlying the faithfulness, say a love for 
the person. But faithfulness does imply that certain important things such 
a person does toward the object of faithfulness are at least chiefly moti-
vated by some concern for it, and that when such concerns are major they 
are not easily outweighed by competing ones. The prioritarian character 
of faithfulness does not in the least imply, then, that no motivational ele-
ments other than those rooted in the motivational underpinnings of the 
faithfulness can move or be deeply respected by the person. Sheer love 
may cooperate with a faithfulness that is based on moral commitments. 
The cooperation may indeed be a case of motivational overdetermination, 
as where a deep love for one’s friends and a religious devotion to helping 
those around one together lead to, and are each sufficiently motivating to 
explain, one’s investing time and energy in helping friends find new jobs 
in difficult economic circumstances.
6Other things equal, the stronger the faithfulness, the wider its prevalence in thought 
and action; but the priority need not be absolute, and there is no simple “proportion” be-
tween strength of faithfulness and the scope of its prevalence. An extremely strong faith-
fulness could be combined with a decisive resolve to separate its “directives” from deci-
sions on certain matters, as where one adheres to certain behavioral standards rejected by 
those to whom one is faithful.
7Granted, a person to whom one is faithful could demand that one be egalitarian even 
in matters that involve choice between that person’s interests and those of others. But the 
faithful person would still tend to give priority to this ideal over certain others. 
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One reaction to motivational overdetermination in expressions of 
faithfulness is to posit a restriction suggested by Kant’s view that actions 
in conformity with duty have moral worth only if performed from duty.8 
One might, then, claim that only where an action appropriate to faith-
fulness is motivated solely by considerations, such as devotion, that may 
be elements in genuine faithfulness, does the action express the virtue 
of faithfulness, whereas, when collaterally motivated, the action is only 
in conformity with faithfulness. I grant that the former manifestations 
of faithfulness are more purely fiducial than are actions governed partly 
by collateral motives such as self-interest. But I cannot see that motiva-
tional purity in this sense is required for an action to express faithfulness. 
And if the collateral motivation is of the right kind, say beneficent desire, 
surely it need not result in action inherently inferior to similar action mo-
tivated only by faithfulness.
Once we appreciate that virtuous persons can at least indirectly affect 
what reasons they have for their actions and which of these reasons actu-
ally or predominantly motivates those actions, we can raise the question 
whether virtue implies a tendency to try to increase or even maximize the 
extent to which one’s deeds appropriate to it are motivated by it. I suggest 
that, for mature, sophisticated agents, this tendency is commonly present; 
but its presence is not a condition for having virtues at all.
It is certainly true, however, that some kinds of acts are more praise-
worthy if performed for certain reasons than if performed for others, 
and that certain kinds of reasons for acting—such as malicious ones—
prevent the actions they motivate from being praiseworthy at all. With 
these points in mind, we might want to say of a kind of reason, such as a 
moral or religious one, that it has paramountcy (in a particular domain) if, 
given any other kind of reason for action (in that domain), acting for the 
former is, other things equal, more praiseworthy, and indeed inherently 
better, than acting for the latter. It might be thought (and arguably Kant 
at some points may have thought or presupposed) that moral reasons are 
paramount in the domain of actions toward other people.9 On this view, 
keeping a burdensome promise from a sense of the duty to keep it would 
be better than keeping it from an affectionate desire to give support. It is 
important to see, however, that many people of religious faith (at least of 
monotheistic faith) tend to see fulfilling divine will as in some sense the 
best kind of reason for action, even if it is not (as it need not be) taken to ex-
clude the cooperation of other reasons, such as moral or affectional ones. 
We need not here judge whether any specific kind of reason is paramount 
in the specified sense. Even if moral reasons are paramount in actions 
8See Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1964), esp. 65–67.
9See, e.g., Groundwork, secs. 397–402 (64–69 in Paton’s translation). Detailed discussion of 
Kant’s view of moral worth in this work is provided in chap. 3 of my Practical Reasoning and 
Ethical Decision (Routledge, London and New York, 2006).
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toward others, faithfulness as a virtue does not entail either acting, or 
even seeking to act, for specifically moral reasons.10
We have seen that faithfulness as a virtue does not entail narrow moti-
vational restrictions, for instance that actions expressing it must be moral-
ly motivated. But this point does not imply that the prioritarian character 
of faithfulness has no distinctive motivational dimension. Even if I do not 
undertake to be motivated toward the objects of my faithfulness purely 
by elements underlying this trait, I should have a sense of some motives 
for action toward them being preferable to other motives, and I should 
tend to focus on the better ones when considering options in the field 
in which faithfulness operates. If, for example, I take it that being faith-
ful to you by doing certain deeds will be to my advantage, then I should 
tend both to ask myself whether they really are best for you and, in any 
case, should try to keep in mind my fiduciary reasons for the deeds rather 
than the self-interested ones. Such self-monitoring and disciplined focus 
on appropriate motives and reasons does not guarantee the motivational 
purity or even the predominance, in grounding the relevant deeds, of the 
preferable motivation. But this monitoring and focus are often appropri-
ate to virtue, and they can favorably influence actions that virtue calls for.
4. The Special Case of Religious Faithfulness
That faithfulness simpliciter is not intrinsically moral does not imply that 
religious faithfulness is not intrinsically moral, or even that attitudinal re-
ligious faith, such as faith in God, is not. Once we realize, however, how 
broad the concept of the religious is, we can see that whether religious 
faithfulness in a particular person is intrinsically moral depends on the 
character of the person’s guiding religious outlook. Similarly, if we do not 
indicate what conception of God is required for having faith in God, there 
is a similar indeterminacy for (attitudinal) religious faith in God. The con-
stitution of attitudinal faith in a given instance depends heavily on how 
the person conceives the object of that faith (even if it should have only an 
intentional object). I propose to minimize the task of analysis by focusing 
on one major representative kind of case familiar in the literature on vir-
tue and in much philosophical literature: Christian faith and faithfulness.
I will assume that the object of Christian faith and faithfulness is God 
and that here God is conceived, in the light of the Christian Bible, as the 
omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good, and loving creator of the physical 
universe (including its human inhabitants). The first three characteristics 
10What this means is indicated in some detail in my “Acting from Virtue,” Mind 104 no. 
415 (1995): 449–471. I should stress that the notion of a moral reason needs explication I can-
not give it here. My point is in part that virtuous persons need not be guided by the concept 
of a moral reason nor seek to act for reasons under the description “moral” (or equivalent 
descriptions). The task of analysis here includes determining just what kind of motivation 
underlying interpersonal actions counts as moral. Much motivational variety lies between, 
for instance, the clearly moral motive of wanting to treat a student justly and, by contrast, 
the spontaneously affectional one of simply wanting to do something for the joy of delight-
ing a friend.
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might be so understood as to entail being loving, but I take this to be 
something more and it should in any case be made explicit.11 I do not mean 
to imply that having Christian faith requires having an articulate under-
standing of these divine attributes. A rough understanding suffices for it.
If we are to understand Christian faithfulness, we also need to under-
stand being loving, though again I must be very brief. Lovingness as a 
trait of character is among the virtues modeled by Jesus. I am also taking 
Christian faith to require a sense of what Jesus means in the love com-
mandments: to love God with all our heart, all our soul, and all our mind, 
and to love our neighbors as ourselves (Matthew 22: 37–39; cf. Mark 12: 
29–31; Leviticus 19:18; and Deuteronomy 6:4). Thus, I am taking Chris-
tian faithfulness to imply keeping faith with God at least in the sense of 
maintaining, on the spiritual side, a sufficient theistic reverence and, on 
the interpersonal side, adequately loving conduct toward others. These 
elements are certainly not the whole of Christian faithfulness, but they 
are central and a good focus here.
If we are to understand the relation between Christian faithfulness and 
love, our first question might be motivational: What kinds of desires must 
we have toward those we love? Loving another surely entails caring (suffi-
ciently strongly) about the other for the other’s sake, not just instrumentally. 
This kind of caring implies a range of intrinsic (hence non-instrumental) 
desires. If one cares about others only as means, one can be beneficent to-
ward them, but does not love them. We should also ask a behavioral ques-
tion: How blind can a loving person be? Can love (and especially Christian 
love) be so blind or misguided that it leads us to harm those we love? This 
depends: if one is too far off the mark as to what will conduce to the other’s 
good, one can only try to be loving and can perhaps lovingly (even tragi-
cally) fail to act lovingly. There is no determinate limit here, but love—and 
certainly Christian love—tolerates blindness only in limited ways. Chris-
tian love, moreover, must to some degree resemble the kinds portrayed by 
Jesus and often modeled, in the Gospels, by his example of loving conduct. 
There is latitude in the expression of love, but also limitation.
5. Religious Faith: Attitudinal Virtues and Virtues of Character
If we assume that love requires a minimally adequate sense of the good 
of the other, that Christian faithfulness embodies Christian love, and that 
such faithfulness is, within limits, prioritarian, we find much of what is 
needed for a virtue of character, even apart from independent elements 
entailed by faithfulness as a trait of character. If we add the egalitarian 
element implicit in the second love commandment (which is plausibly 
taken to imply a kind of basic parity between different people), we find 
the core of a central moral requirement: justice. Christian faithfulness, 
then, is both a virtue of character given its anchoring in love and, in part, 
11For an indication of the importance of taking God to be loving, see Robert Merrihew 
Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999).
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a moral virtue, given its egalitarian element. It implies keeping faith with 
others and, in a certain way, treating them equally.
Can we say that Christian attitudinal faith—the kind of faith in God 
sketched earlier—when it is strong and deeply rooted, is itself a virtue of 
character? The question is especially difficult because there is no sharp 
distinction between a trait of character and a strong, deeply rooted, be-
haviorally pivotal, cognitive-motivational-affective element. If a strong and 
deeply rooted Christian faith is not itself a virtue of character, it is (if pre-
dominantly guided by the love commandments) at least a virtuous attitude; 
and the more influential in conduct a virtuous attitude is, the closer it comes 
to dominating the fields in which virtue manifests itself and the closer it 
comes to constituting a virtue of character. We can, then, distinguish two 
kinds of virtues, or in any case two kinds of characteristic the term “virtue” 
may designate. If we are guided by the use of “virtue” most prominent in 
the literature of virtue ethics, we might use the term mainly for virtues in 
the full-blooded, characterological sense. But, as we have seen, there is also an 
attitudinal sense of “virtue,” illustrated where we use the term for a person’s 
belief in democracy, respect for learning, or deep conviction that everyone 
should have the benefit of the doubt. What are some of the differences?
Virtues of character must be traits of character, in a sense implying 
a certain rootedness. Attitudinal virtues—which may be constituted by 
any of a wide variety of propositional attitudes having the right stability, 
strength, and content—are different in at least three respects. They are, 
like faith in God, focal, being directed toward a single if multifaceted ob-
ject in a way a character trait is not; they need not be rooted in the same 
way or as firmly; and apparently they are not uncommonly produced on 
a single occasion by powerful influences, such as religious conversion. 
Granted, it is not impossible that the rootedness of some attitudes exceed 
that of the minimally rooted traits. Still, the firmness threshold for character 
traits is higher than for attitudes. Traits must have a minimal firmness 
that attitudes need not achieve.
Granted, faithfulness as a trait can, like attitudinal faith, be manifested 
only in loyalty to a single person; but someone having the trait can retain 
it across change of object and would be expected to do so upon acquiring, 
say, new friends as objects of faithfulness, whereas attitudinal virtues are 
more closely tied to their objects. Faith in God, for instance, is clearly not 
the same attitudinal virtue as faith in forgiveness as a mitigator of hatred 
or even the same virtue as religiously inspired faith in the ideals that one 
takes God to require us to have. It is also true that brain manipulation, 
or, in principle, powerful psychological influences, might produce a trait 
with the right kind of rootedness, but the latter kind of genesis is a lim-
iting case for traits of character yet only unusual for attitudinal traits.12 
12An implication of this point is that the notion of a virtue is not historical, in a sense im-
plying a particular kind of genesis, as is suggested (but I think not entailed) by Aristotle’s 
view in the Nicomachean Ethics that virtues arise by habituation.
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Quite apart from this contrast, however, Christian faith, like other kinds 
of faith, some religious and some not, can surely be an attitudinal virtue.
The appropriateness of calling attitudinal faith, in certain paradigmat-
ic cases, a virtue is confirmed by the value of some of its major elements. It 
makes possible a kind of trust that can come only when one is not utterly 
certain of everything the person in whom one has faith will do. This trust 
invites, even if it often does not engender, a counterpart trust. When, as 
is usual, faith in a person is partly based on a sense of the person’s good 
qualities, it expresses a positive attitude toward that person and, often, a 
kind of overall affirmation of the person’s value; it also provides an impor-
tant part of, or at least a basis for developing, a relationship in which the 
person of faith can be valued, supported, or otherwise positively affected.
There is a further step I propose we take. So far, we have spoken main-
ly of faithfulness as a character trait and of attitudinal faith as an impor-
tant psychological element in anyone who has a kind of faith properly 
called religious. There is also a personal characteristic that, in at least one 
way, falls between these two: being a person of faith, where the faith is reli-
gious (as is usually intended when this term is applied to someone with-
out qualification). This kind of faith I take to be a kind of overall stance: 
something more comprehensive and more influential in thought, feeling, 
and conduct than is typical for attitudinal faith, yet, though stable and 
typically both resolute and enduring, not necessarily a trait of character.13 
Being a person of faith—certainly of Christian faith—limits the kind and 
range of character traits one may have, but it need not constitute such a 
trait, even if there are instances of it that do. To concentrate again on the 
example of Christian faith, I do not think that one can count as a person 
of Christian faith without possessing both religious faith having content 
appropriate to Christianity and (focal) faithfulness to normative elements 
in Christianity that entail, for thought, feeling, and action, much of what 
is entailed by having the character trait of (global) faithfulness. That trait 
of character, however, does not entail specifically Christian beliefs or at-
titudes. With all this in mind, let us explore whether being a person of 
Christian faith constitutes having a virtue.
6. Christian Faith as a Virtue of Personality
A number of considerations support an affirmative answer. It is plain that, 
in having the attitudinal faith required for being a person of Christian 
faith, one would have at least one attitudinal virtue; but where one has 
the stance required for being a person of Christian faith I propose also 
to speak of virtues of personality and to maintain that being a person of 
Christian faith instantiates one of these virtues. (The same kind of point 
holds for other actual or possible religious faiths, and I hope this paper 
13It appears that the kind of stance I am calling a virtue here seems to fit the broad char-
acterization of virtue given by Robert Merrihew Adams in A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in 
Being for the Good (Oxford: Clarendon, 2006). He says, e.g., that “being for x must involve 
dispositions to favor x in action, desire, emotion, or feeling” (17). 
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encourages exploration of some of the important cases.) Let me explain 
this notion.
Here we should first note the kinds of elements important for under-
standing virtues of character, since those virtues are the kinds of traits 
with which we should compare virtues of personality. There are at least 
six conceptually important kinds of elements whose recognition helps in 
understanding faithfulness and other fiduciary notions.14 The first element 
is the field (or domain) of a virtue, roughly the kind of human situation in 
which it characteristically governs conduct. The field of, for example, be-
neficence is open-ended, as is that of faithfulness, but situations of human 
need stand out for both. The second element is the characteristic “targets” 
the virtue leads the agent to aim at. In this aim, faithfulness as a character 
trait—global faithfulness—is similar to beneficence in having scope over 
an open-ended range of situations, say those in which the object of alle-
giance needs support. The third case is that of the beneficiaries of the vir-
tue, above all (and perhaps solely) the person(s) who properly benefit from 
our realizing it: for veracity, interlocutors; for fidelity—hence for one kind 
of faithfulness—family, friends, or larger groups such as one’s commu-
nity; and so on. The fourth case is the agent’s understanding of the field of 
the virtue, encompassing both its targets and the context calling for mani-
festation of the virtue; for instance, understanding criteria for benefiting 
others is crucial for beneficence. Fifth, there is the agent’s motivation to act 
in a way that befits the virtue. Faithfulness illustrates this: just as the vera-
cious cannot be truthful simply to promote their own interests, so, where 
faithfulness is a virtue, it must embody sufficiently strong desires to be 
loyal to (or to protect or advance, and so forth) the person or object toward 
which it is directed. Sixth, there is the psychological grounding of the rel-
evant action tendencies, roughly their rootedness in the agent. Desire to 
do (say) loyal deeds is one thing; doing them for the right kind of reason is 
another. Such grounding is important for distinguishing actions that are 
merely in conformity with virtue from those performed from it and hence 
truly virtuous, in the sense implying that they bespeak good character.
With these elements of virtue in mind, consider the characteristic in-
stantiated by being a person of Christian faith. This is global faith. It 
entails focal attitudinal faith, such as faith in God’s love, but is not re-
ducible to any set of such focal elements. Its field includes that of benefi-
cence; and in its theological dimensions, this faith carries a commitment 
to forms of life that make admirable ideals central. Its “target,” then, is at 
least this: an integration of, on one side, a worldly commitment to human 
good and, on the other, a reverential theological devotion that supports 
both this commitment and also attitudes, ideals, and practices which pro-
vide wide scope for the development of human excellences. Regarding 
14This paragraph draws on ideas in my “Acting from Virtue,” cited above. Swanton 
makes much use of the metaphor of the target of a virtue and elaborates on other elements 
among the six I characterize; see, e.g., Swanton, Virtue Ethics, 231–239.
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the beneficiaries of Christian faith as an element in personality, these 
are the same as the beneficiaries of the non-religious virtue of a loving 
beneficence, but, at least in the eyes of the faithful, they include getting 
or maintaining oneself in the right relation to God. The understanding 
by which a person of Christian faith is guided is essentially based on 
an understanding of scripture and, particularly, of the example of Jesus. 
This implies the kind of prioritarian, benevolent motivation characteris-
tic of a strong beneficence. In some Christians, it may also imply—and a 
case can be made that for Christians it always should imply—taking the 
kinds of religiously enjoined motives in question to have paramountcy 
as reasons for action; but even apart from so conceiving such reasons, a 
person of Christian faith must take the kinds of beneficent and reveren-
tial considerations in question to be of high importance. In the light of all 
these points, where a person’s stance in life is Christian faith, virtuous 
conduct and, given sufficient stability and rootedness in the faith, virtues 
of character are to be expected.
Such a stance is certainly a kind of virtue, and it might also correspond 
to one or more traits of character; but there is a rationale for the more qual-
ified terminology I propose: personality is a wider notion than character, 
and traits of personality (the rough category in which I include being a 
person of Christian faith) need not count as traits of character. Consider, 
for instance, being sunny or, at the other end, phlegmatic, humorless, or 
dull. The contrast between character and personality may be sharpened 
by two further points.
First, having good character entails having all, or nearly all, the virtues 
(of character) to at least some significant degree, and it precludes hav-
ing vices, to any significant degree, or virtually any other traits contrary 
to virtue. Someone who is not honest does not have good character; and 
even courage, which is not a moral virtue, and generosity, which is not a 
major virtue, must be possessed to some significant degree by a person 
of good character. Selfishness would be disqualifying, and only limited 
ungenerousness is consistent with beneficence.
Second, a world in which we are all alike in having good character 
would not imply that we are much alike in personality. Good character, 
and, related to it, virtues of character, are largely a matter of meeting cer-
tain normative standards, and a specific ideal of good character for all of 
us might be unobjectionable, whereas a specific ideal of good personality 
would be confining and undesirable.
By contrast with “good character,” “good personality,” if it has a clear 
use, designates not mainly aretaic elements but, roughly, elements that 
make a person good company. Our personalities are mainly—though not 
entirely—constellations of traits that tend to distinguish us from one an-
other. Being a person of Christian faith has a kind of multiple realizability 
that tends to do this and certainly tends to do it more than simply having 
good character. It is, we might say, more individuating than a character 
trait that constitutes a virtue of character. Following the example of Jesus 
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requires more than living up to his precepts or any set of sound moral 
standards; and the more one internalizes his example, the more one’s per-
sonality is shaped: there will be, for instance—though in different patterns 
and styles—patience, gentleness, forgivingness, humility in demeanor, a 
special affection for children, a reverence for persons and nature. A person 
of Christian faith, then, will tend to have good character but also to have 
certain attitudes towards others and indeed the universe, and certain 
interpersonal tendencies, that go beyond good character. Compare a sense 
of humor. Perhaps this is also a virtue of personality, but it carries no 
presumption of good character. As to good character, it does not require 
being a person of religious faith and even allows a kind of skepticism 
about God and humanity that would be a contrary of such faith.
The contrast between Christian faithfulness (being a person of Chris-
tian faith) as a virtue of personality and virtues of character does not 
diminish the importance of the former. The contrast implies nothing 
about how good for a person it might be to have Christian faith; the point 
distinguishes the aretaic from the theological, but implies no limit to 
the possible significance of the theological. Moreover, even apart from 
whether we distinguish between virtues of character and those of per-
sonality, much of what is important about virtue—especially the way in 
which it provides stable, often prioritarian, and wide-ranging tendencies 
to achieve the appropriate kind of good—is manifested by what I am call-
ing virtues of personality and even by certain attitudinal virtues. All of 
them, moreover, are inherently good.
As some of our discussion suggests, the distinction between a trait of 
character and certain kinds of deeply entrenched attitudes that heavily in-
fluence conduct is not sharp, nor is the distinction between character and 
personality, or between a virtue of personality and one of character. All of 
these are at least largely constituted by cognitive and motivational elements 
in persons, and all play roles in producing and sustaining conduct. But 
each category contains some elements not belonging to any of the others, 
and clarity is enhanced by observing the indicated distinctions. Let me 
draw a further contrast that will clarify my view.
Very roughly, character traits are, in a certain sense, at least mainly action-
centered: psychological elements appropriately developed, and manifested, 
by doing the right kinds of things for the right kinds of reasons. Global 
faith—as embodied in being a person of religious faith—is, comparatively, 
though by no means exclusively, cognitively centered: an element appropri-
ately developed, and manifested, by believing (or otherwise cognizing, as in 
having faith toward) the right kinds of things on the right kinds of grounds. 
A second contrast between global faith, in the religious sense relevant here, 
and character traits, is this. That faith embodies attitudinal faith toward 
persons central in the religion in question, whereas traits of character do 
not have a comparably close relation to any similar (focal) attitude. These 
differences allow, as I have granted, for many important similarities, in-
cluding much overlap in motivation and conduct.
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To be sure, being a person of Christian faith is a major characteristic and, 
in those who have it, bears importantly on their character understood in 
a wide sense. But not every good characteristic bearing on character need 
be a virtue of character. Virtues of character by their very nature seem to 
be tied to ethics in a way faith is not. This may be in part why religious 
faith has been conceived as a theological virtue.
7. Conclusion
Virtues of character, I have suggested, are praiseworthy character traits 
that tend to ground conduct and to motivate their possessors to pursue the 
particular good or kind of good with respect to which the traits count as vir-
tues. Virtues are by their nature inherently good as elements in character. 
Faithfulness as a virtue of character counts as, in some way, inherently 
good even if, like courage, it is not by its nature morally good. Despite 
the close association between faithfulness and faith, faithfulness as a trait 
does not imply faith as an attitude, nor does the latter imply the former. We 
can be faithful to those we do not have faith in, and we can have faith in 
a person to whom we are not faithful. Faithfulness, as entailing a positive 
stance toward its object, implies meriting a certain kind of trust; attitudinal 
faith implies having a certain kind of trust in its object. These properties 
are quite different, and neither entails the other. But where faithfulness is 
of a certain kind, as in the case of faithfulness to certain broad ideals or 
to a sound moral code, it may embody moral elements and may also have 
attitudinal faith as a distinctive constituent. Similarly, where attitudinal 
faith has an object that demands a kind of allegiance, as does Christian 
faith understood as I have very partially sketched it, then if the faith is suf-
ficiently deep and adequately motivating, it may be a virtue at least in the 
sense of a merit, and it may yield much the same conduct as does faithful-
ness to its object. Being a person of faith, moreover, may constitute having 
a virtue of personality. Virtues of personality belong to a third category of 
virtues, lying between the characterological and the attitudinal. I have il-
lustrated this with respect to Christian faith. Faith and faithfulness, apart 
from moral or religious elements that guide their influence on us, may be 
misplaced; but where they have the right kinds of objects and are guided 
by the kinds of good those objects of fidelity represent, they may be per-
vasive and incalculably valuable elements in human life.15
University of Notre Dame
15The paper has benefitted from discussion of earlier versions at the Eastern Division 
of the American Philosophical Association (2009), the Goethe University’s Conference on 
Faith and Reason (2009), Saint Louis University, and the University of Notre Dame’s Ethics 
Discussion Group. For helpful comments I am grateful to Andrew Chignell, Kevin Timpe, 
Christian Miller, John Schellenberg, Richard Swinburne, William Wainwright, anonymous 
referees for the Journal, and, especially, Robert Merrihew Adams, who served as commen-
tator in the APA symposium, and the editor, Thomas Flint.
